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A B S T R A C T   
Conflicts between opposing objectives of wildlife conservation and agriculture are increasing globally due to 
rising human food production and competition with wildlife over land use. Conservation conflicts are often 
complex and driven by variability and uncertainty in wildlife distribution and stakeholder wealth and power. To 
manage conflicts, empowering local stakeholders by decentralizing decisions and actions has been suggested to 
promote democratization and awareness of stakeholders. There is, however, a current gap in the understanding 
of how stakeholder empowerment (e.g., farmers’ and managers’ practical, time or monetary resources) affects 
policy effectiveness. In this study, we apply an individual-based model of management strategy evaluation to 
simulate the conservation conflict surrounding protected and thriving common cranes (Grus grus) causing 
damage to agricultural production in Sweden and along the European flyways. We model the effect of farmer 
empowerment (i.e., increasing budgets to affect populations and agricultural production) in four management 
scenarios, in which we manipulate the availability and cost of two actions farmers may take in response to crane 
presence on their land: non-lethal (scaring) or lethal (culling) control. We find that lower budgets lead to in-
creases in population size due to increased use of less costly scaring instead of shooting. Higher farmer budgets 
lead to increased population extinction risk. Intermediate budgets allow farmers to control the population size 
around the management target and limit impact on agricultural production to intermediate levels. Our study 
highlights that stakeholder empowerment and culling strategies based on the number of stakeholders, and 
particularly their power to implement effective actions, needs careful consideration and monitoring when setting 
management targets and strategies. Further, our results show that empowering individual farmers has the po-
tential to contribute to conflict management and to balance agricultural with conservation objectives, but 
increased stakeholder involvement also requires careful planning and monitoring.   
1. Introduction 
Conflicts between the objectives of wildlife conservation (i.e., species 
protection, habitat restoration) and sustainable agriculture are 
increasing globally due to a rising human demand for food production 
and consequent competition with wildlife over land use (Henle et al., 
2008; Redpath et al., 2013). Such conflicts have been identified as one of 
the major causes of failed management strategies and can thus result in 
negative impacts on conservation outcomes and stakeholders’ liveli-
hoods and psychosocial wellbeing (Barua et al., 2013; Hodgson et al., 
2019; Redpath et al., 2013). Due to their complex and dynamic nature, 
conflicts like these are often described as ‘wicked problems’, charac-
terized and driven by the variation and uncertainty in, e.g., wildlife 
distribution and inequity in stakeholder wealth and power (Bennett 
et al., 2017; Mason et al., 2018; Young et al., 2016). In the case of 
herbivore populations, conflicts often arise when wildlife forage on and 
cause damage to crops, and when management options to reduce this are 
limited due to protection of the species or social opposition towards 
mitigation interventions (Dickman, 2010). Particularly good examples 
of such ‘wicked’ conservation conflicts involve protected cranes (Grus 
spp.) and geese (Branta, Anser spp.), which currently have exponentially 
increasing populations causing negative impacts on agricultural land in 
Europe and North America, especially on land surrounding protected 
areas designated for those species and biodiversity in general (Cusack 
et al., 2019; Fox and Madsen, 2017; Nilsson et al., 2019). Negative im-
pacts caused by wildlife are often managed by culling to reduce 
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populations under the assumption that agricultural loss will decrease 
accordingly (Montràs-Janer et al., 2019). However, due to protection or 
practical limitations, non-lethal mitigation methods (e.g., scaring, 
diversionary feeding, monetary compensation) are often required 
instead of culling (Cusack et al., 2019; EC, 2009; Owen, 1990). Yet, the 
management of many species, including cranes and geese, remains 
problematic in part due to time lags in centralized managers’ actions as a 
response to negative impact on agricultural production (Cusack et al., 
2019). This may aggravate conflicts by weakening stakeholder trust and 
willingness to act in line with policy (Bennett et al., 2017; Cusack et al., 
2019; Young et al., 2016). To manage conflicts like these, empowering 
local stakeholders and their expertise by decentralizing decisions and 
actions has been proposed to integrate complexity and democratization 
into the management process (Mason et al., 2018; Raik et al., 2008; 
Redpath et al., 2017). However, there is currently a gap in the under-
standing of how stakeholder empowerment (i.e., practical, time or 
monetary resources) affects sustainability and extinction risk of the 
population as well as agricultural production. In the extreme, decen-
tralizing decisions to farming stakeholders without providing budgets to 
enact actions may fuel frustration and conflict with policy makers and 
managers and lead to ineffective management; whereas unlimited 
farming stakeholder budgets may cause conflicts when conservation 
stakeholder objectives supersede management objectives (Mason et al., 
2018; Redpath et al., 2013). 
Decision making in natural resource management is traditionally 
assumed to be based on stakeholder objectives to maximize their returns 
in terms of livelihood given a limited set of actions, ability and budget to 
perform them (D. Hodgson et al., 2020; Milner-Gulland, 2011). For 
example, farmers aim to maximize their agricultural production given 
the land and labor they have, whereas managers might instead aim to 
keep wildlife populations within a range where long term viability is 
ensured given their ability to monitor the population and enforce their 
policies. In pursuing these aims, practical limitations (e.g., available 
time and resources) will constrain the power of both farmers and man-
agers to act, leading to trade-offs in decision-making. Game theory 
formally describes situations with such strategic actions, in which the 
consequences of an individual’s decisions are influenced by the de-
cisions taken by others (Hauert et al., 2006). For example, the success of 
a manager’s decisions toward fulfilling conservation objectives through 
policy or economic incentives might be affected by the decisions of 
stakeholders to comply or not (Colyvan et al., 2011; Milner-Gulland, 
2011; Redpath et al., 2018). Hence, while many existing models assume 
that policy will be enacted faithfully, this assumption might not always 
be realistic, such as under used culling quotas due to deficient number of 
hunters (Butterworth, 1999; Milne, 2018; Milner-Gulland, 2012). 
Small perturbations in stakeholder behavior or policy in uncertain 
and dynamic systems might result in severe and unforeseen implications 
for the dynamics of the entire system, including both human behavior (i. 
e., social tipping points) and increased extinction risk in the focal 
wildlife population (i.e., ecological tipping points) (Heal and Kun-
reuther, 2012; Scheffer et al., 2012). Complexity and uncertainty make 
empirical evaluation of management outcomes (i.e., agent responses) 
challenging. To account for uncertainty at multiple points in the man-
agement process, the management strategy evaluation (i.e., MSE) 
framework has been developed (Smith, 1999). However, until now, MSE 
models have incorporated constant decision-making rules for single 
managers or farmers over time (Bunnefeld et al., 2013; Melbourne--
Thomas et al., 2017; Milner-Gulland, 2011). A newly developed 
framework for generalized management strategy evaluation (i.e., GMSE) 
includes scenarios that can include multiple independent stakeholders 
making individual decisions, as influenced by changes in resources, 
policy, and individual circumstance (Duthie et al., 2018). 
In this study, we apply the management strategy evaluation frame-
work using the GMSE R package to simulate the conservation conflict 
case of protected common cranes congregating in large numbers (i.e., up 
to 26,000 ind.) at agricultural staging sites in Sweden, causing 
significant damage to agricultural production (inspected and compen-
sated damage totals up to 200.000 Euros/year) (Montràs-Janer et al., 
2019; Nilsson et al., 2019). Cranes are protected in Annex I in the Eu-
ropean Birds Directive and thus from culling to regulate the population. 
The directive states that the listed species’ survival and reproduction 
must be ensured in their distribution range, but allows for licensed lethal 
culling to mitigate negative impact on human livelihoods and when 
non-lethal damage preventive measures (e.g., scaring, diversionary 
feeding) have been found unsuccessful (EC, 2009). Due to the protective 
legislation, no management targets are defined for the maximum pop-
ulations size on either staging site or flyway level, but as these pop-
ulations will likely continue to grow, so will the stakeholder demand for 
lethal or non-lethal crop damage preventive strategies and the severity 
of the conservation conflict (Fox and Madsen, 2017; Montràs-Janer 
et al., 2019). By applying the MSE framework in this study, we aim to 
identify the effect of increasing stakeholder power (i.e., decentralizing 
decisions to enact policy), on all aspects of the system, including the 
objectives to keep a viable wildlife population and sustainable agricul-
tural production over time, and the implications for managing conflict. 
More specifically, we investigate how increasing the ability of individual 
stakeholders to enact decisions at the farm scale affects broader scale 
changes in expected crane population sizes and agricultural production 
in four possible management scenarios: a.) no management and no 
stakeholder power to affect cranes, b.) scaring and culling of cranes, with 
a management objective to allow the population to increase to an 
effectively high management target (i.e., 100,000 ind.), c.) only culling 
allowed, but with an effectively high management target and d.) scaring 
and culling with a management objective to keep the population at a 
lower target (i.e., 15,000 ind.) to lower the negative impact on agri-
cultural production. 
2. Model 
The model description follows the ODD (Overview, Design concepts, 
Details) protocol for describing individual- and agent-based models 
(Grimm et al., 2006), as updated by Grimm et al. (2020). The full ODD 
description, including the Details section and R code to replicate all 
simulations can be found in Supplementary Material 1. 
2.1. Purpose and patterns 
The purpose of the model is to predict how increasing the ability of 
individual stakeholders to enact decisions at the farm scale affects 
broader scale changes in expected crane population sizes and agricul-
tural production in four possible management scenarios over 30 years. 
To do this, we used the package GMSE v0.6.0.4 in R (Duthie et al., 
2018). GMSE simulates the management strategy evaluation process in a 
way that models goal-oriented behavior and spatial distribution of in-
dividual stakeholders, managers and wildlife using an individual-based 
(i.e., agent-based) framework (Bunnefeld et al., 2011; Duthie et al., 
2018). The four management scenarios simulated were: a.) no man-
agement and no stakeholder power to affect cranes, b.) scaring and 
culling of cranes, with a management objective to allow the population 
to increase to an effectively high management target (i.e., 100,000 ind.), 
c.) only culling allowed, but with an effectively high management target 
and d.) scaring and culling with a management objective to keep the 
population at a lower target (i.e., 15,000 ind.) to lower the negative 
impact on agricultural production. 
2.1.1. Management scenario a 
Scenario a is a null model for population size and mean agricultural 
production when no scaring or culling is conducted and the crane 
population can grow exponentially. Currently, there is a lack of man-
agement targets both nationally and for the whole population along the 
flyways, so this reflects the current lack of population regulation. 
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2.1.2. Management scenario b 
Scenario b models current management in Sweden, which allows for 
intensive scaring methods to reduce loss in agricultural production 
(specifically using scaring by the use of gas cannons, scare crows, flags). 
Very limited culling (i.e., up to 15 individuals licensed to a minority of 
the farmers) is occasionally permitted by the managing authorities 
(EEA, n.d.). In our model, the strict licensing procedure for culling is 
represented by a high cost for culling for the farmer, unlike scaring, and 
was regulated in the simulations by setting a very high management 
target, i.e., ensuring a condition where the manager would always set a 
high cost for culling. Non-lethal scaring may divert cranes from single 
cells at the landscape, but will not affect population size and a scenario 
only permitting scaring was therefore not considered. 
2.1.3. Management scenario c 
Scenario c models a hypothetical scenario where although culling is 
expected to be costly, thus the manager is expected to keep costs of 
culling very high) there either is no alternative action possible, or 
alternative actions like scaring are prohibited or widely perceived to be 
ineffective and therefore never taken. 
2.1.4. Management scenario d 
Scenario d models a situation where managers permit both scaring 
and culling, but managers attempt to keep the crane population at a size 
well below presumed carrying capacity. This allows for a more dynamic 
allocation of budget for both farmers and managers, which consequently 
mimics a trade-off between the objectives to sustain agricultural pro-
duction while ensuring viability of the crane population. 
We evaluate our model by its ability to reproduce the pattern of 
population growth in the previous 30 years leading up to the current 
population year 2020. By parameterizing the model with the parameter 
values (i.e., initial population size and reproductive output, for details 
see Initialization in Supplementary Material 1) derived from the model 
simulations and based on previous empirical data on crane numbers, we 
can test if the model reproduces the pattern of population growth given 
realistic initial conditions. Recovering this pattern demonstrates that the 
model was fit for purpose in that we could then use it to test new sce-
narios against (i.e., management scenario a-d). 
2.2. Entities, state variables and scales 
Farmers, managers and cranes operate on an agricultural landscape 
(L), modelled as a torus of discrete cells owned by individual farmers 
and producing a potentially variable yield of agricultural crop (i.e., 
agricultural production). Each landscape cell thus has unique traits 
including farmer ownership, x-y location (Lxy), agricultural production 
and density of cranes in each time step. Only one farmer can own a single 
Lxy cell, but any number of cranes can occupy a single cell. In this study, 
L was constructed as a grid of 100 × 100 cells, representing a total 
staging area of about 200 km2 (Nilsson et al., 2018), utilized by a total of 
50 farmers earning the majority of their livelihood from agriculture (≥ 1 
km2 per farmer; Holmer, 2016; The Swedish Board of Agriculture, 
2017). 
GMSE models discrete individuals, which here include farmers, 
managers, and cranes. Each individual has potentially unique traits, 
which potentially affect their behavior. Each farmer owns a fixed 
number of contiguous landscape cells (L, see above) on which they can 
perform one or more types of actions. Each farmer has a budget Bf for 
performing actions, which can be broadly interpreted to encompass one 
or more factors limiting the total number of actions possible for the 
farmer during a single time step such as time, money, or available 
equipment. Thus, individual farmers’ traits include their budget and 
farm location. Managers do not own landscape cells, but instead set 
policy that affects the costs of performing actions for farmers (Caction). 
Managers have traits in terms of a budget Bm for setting policy, which 
can be broadly interpreted to encompass the factors that limit the power 
of managers to make and enforce policy decisions. Managers either do 
not attempt to regulate crane population density, or attempt to maintain 
cranes at some target population density (N†) at every time step by 
setting policy (i.e., costs for farmer actions). The traits for individual 
cranes are location, age and reproductive output. In this study, a single 
time step is modelled as one year. For a definitions of state variable 
entities, landscape and model parameters, see Table S1 in Supplemen-
tary Material 1. 
2.3. Process overview and scheduling 
The model includes four sub models operating in sequence over a 
single time step (Fig. 1). For detailed information on definition and use 
of parameters and modeling procedure, see Supplementary Material 1. 
2.4. The crane population sub model 
The first sub model simulates the population dynamics of Nt cranes in 
time step t. Cranes arrive at a randomly selected cell within Rm cells of 
the one that they left in t-1 with equal probability (crane cell location is 
randomly selected in t = 1), then feed Rfe times. Between each feeding, 
cranes move to a cell within Rm cells in any direction from the currently 
occupied cell on the landscape randomly selected with equal probabil-
ity. Cranes then give birth to young, then potentially die of old age. 
Initial population size for each simulation was independently 
sampled from the distribution of simulated terminal abundances from 
the 100 nrep replicate simulations in years 1989–2019 (see ‘Initialization’ 
in Supplementary Material 1. & Fig. S1 in Supplementary Material 2.). 
2.5. The observation sub model 
The observation model uses a monitoring method in which cranes 
are counted with complete accuracy on a subset of the landscape (i.e., 
10 × 10 cells) and density is then extrapolated to estimate the crane 
population size assuming the same density over the entire landscape. 
Hence, estimated population size N̂ might deviate from the true N. 
Fig. 1. The concept of the generalized management strategy evaluation 
modeling (GMSE) framework. The model consists of four sub model (see 
number 1–4) operating in sequence for each time step. 
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2.6. The manager sub model 
The manager sub model assesses N̂ in relation to a management 
target, and sets policy by defining action costs (Caction; these may be 
conceptualized as, e.g., time, practical or monetary costs for different 
actions farmers may take to affect agricultural production, including 
culling or scaring cranes). Managers use an evolutionary algorithm to set 
costs for each action; this algorithm models the heuristic process of the 
manager considering different potential policies and choosing one that 
will result in a crane population density nearer to the manager’s target 
(see Supplementary Material 1). Once the algorithm is completed, 
managers enact the cost of each available farmer action. The total 
budget for the manager was kept constant in the model (i.e., Bm = 1000). 
See Supplemental Material 1 for details on parameterization of the 
evolutionary algorithm. 
2.7. The farmer sub model 
In the farmer sub model, farmers implement actions with the 
objective to maximize their own agricultural production, constrained by 
the costs of individual actions as set by the manager’s policy and the 
farmers’ annual budgets (Bf). As with manager policy decisions, farmer 
decisions are chosen by running a single independent evolutionary al-
gorithm for each farmer in each time step. Farmers recognize that the 
presence of cranes on a landscape cell has a negative effect on agricul-
tural production, and will therefore adaptively use actions to try to 
effectively decrease the presence of cranes. Individual stakeholder de-
cisions consequently affect cranes and agricultural production over 
multiple time steps. All actions of all farmers are performed in a random 
order so that, for example, one farmer does not do all of their scaring or 
culling before another farmer and thereby cause differences in farmer’s 
agricultural production due to the order of farmer actions. Farmers can 
only take actions on land that they own. 
2.8. Design concepts 
2.8.1. Basic principles 
To account for uncertainty at multiple points in a natural resource 
management process, the management strategy evaluation (i.e., MSE) 
framework has been developed (Smith, 1999). MSE models have 
incorporated constant decision-making rules for single managers or 
farmers over time (Bunnefeld et al., 2013; Melbourne-Thomas et al., 
2017; Milner-Gulland, 2011). However, the generalized management 
strategy evaluation framework (i.e., GMSE) used in this study includes 
multiple independent stakeholders making individual decisions, as 
influenced by changes in resources, policy, and individual circumstance 
(Duthie et al., 2018). GMSE simulates the management strategy evalu-
ation process in a way that models goal-oriented behavior and spatial 
distribution of individual stakeholders, managers and wildlife using an 
individual-based (i.e., agent-based) framework (Bunnefeld et al., 2011; 
Duthie et al., 2018). 
The observation model uses a “virtual ecologist” approach (Zurell 
et al., 2010) to model manager observation of the crane population. 
2.8.2. Emergence 
Crane population dynamics and agricultural production emerge over 
time, based on the individual decisions of the manager (i.e., setting 
policy) and farmers (i.e., taking action). 
2.8.3. Adaptation 
Evolutionary algorithms are useful heuristic tools that mimic the 
process of biological evolution to find solutions to highly complex 
problems (Hamblin, 2013). In our simulations, these complex problems 
refer to modeling the goal-oriented decision making of managers and 
farmers. Managers must attempt to use their available budget to set costs 
that keep crane populations near a pre-specified target, while farmers 
must attempt to use their available budget and any actions available to 
maximize agricultural production. The possible actions that farmers can 
take to reduce impact on agricultural production include non-lethal 
scaring, one action of which causes one crane to randomly relocate to 
a new cell before damaging crops (note, this could potentially result in 
the crane resettling on another cell owned by the acting farmer), or 
culling, one action of which causes one crane to be completely removed 
from the landscape before damaging crops (see scenario a-b). Decisions 
within the model are made under uncertainty, as is realistic for stake-
holders in empirical social-ecological systems, and behavior is conse-
quently heuristic often suboptimal. The Section “The evolutionary 
algorithm used in the manager and farmers sub models” in Supple-
mentary material 1 explains how the evolutionary algorithm is used to 
model manager and farmer decision making, with further detail of this 
general approach available in Supporting Information 1 of Duthie et al. 
(2018). 
2.8.4. Objectives 
The objective of the farmers is to maximize total agricultural pro-
duction Yf across all of the landscape cells that they own. Whereas the 
managers’ objective is to set a policy (in terms of action costs) that 
minimizes the distance between the crane population target and the 
current population level (Duthie et al., 2018). 
2.8.5. Learning 
We included a learning process in each run of the evolutionary al-
gorithm by seeding it with 20 copies of the strategy from the previous 
time step, allowing it to potentially learn from the previous time step 
and more efficiently find a successful strategy given similar conditions. 
2.8.6. Prediction 
Managers predict farmers’ actions in the evolutionary algorithm 
fitness function by assuming that the total number of actions in a time 
step will be proportional to those in the previous time step weighted by 
its cost, e.g., if the cost doubles, then half the number of actions are 
predicted. 
2.8.7. Sensing 
Sensing is incorporated in the modeling in that farmers know that 
cranes decrease agricultural production Farmers also know which 
landscape cells and what proportion of the landscape that they own, the 
costs of actions, and the probability of cranes landing back in their 
owned cells after being scared. Managers estimate how many cranes are 
on the landscape. They also know the total number of actions taken by 
farmers in the previous time step, that culling decreases the number of 
cranes by one plus the number of offspring that it is expected to produce, 
and that scaring does not decrease the crane number. 
2.8.8. Interaction 
Cranes interact with the landscape by decreasing the agricultural 
production on the cell that they occupy and feed. Individual farmers, 
manager and cranes also interact with each other by adaptively making 
decisions based on current conditions. Managers make decisions based 
on estimated crane abundance and previous farmer actions, whereas 
farmers make decisions based on crane distribution on their land, 
management policy (i.e., available actions) and budget. For details about 
interactions, see descriptions of sub models and sensing. 
2.8.9. Stochasticity 
In dynamic socio-ecological systems like the one studied here, it may 
be likely that empowerment of farmers (i.e., budgets Bf) to perform ac-
tions varies among individuals at a given time step. To assess the effect 
of such potential variability in farmer’s budgets, we repeated simula-
tions for each of the scenarios with budgets varying among individuals 
by Bf ± 50 in each time step. Stochasticity was also included in the crane 
population sub model by allowing movement of cranes to random cells 
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within a given spatial range and by sampling the crane offspring number 
from a Poisson distribution with a rate parameter of Rb = 0.118. 
2.8.10. Collectives 
No collectives are implemented in the model. 
2.8.11. Observation 
We simulated increasingly empowered farmers, running simulation 
for a range of available budgets Bf = {50, 100, …, 3950, 4000}, with 40 
simulation replicates for each budget value across four management 
scenarios (a-d) over 30 years. We extracted selected performance met-
rics for each time step t (year 2020–2049); crane population size N, 
percentage of maximum agricultural production (i.e., observed agri-
cultural production (Yf)/maximum agricultural production) over the 
individual farmers’ cells (scenario a-b), number of culled individuals per 
farmer (scenario b-d) and number of scaring actions performed per 
farmer (scenario b & d; Table 1). 
3. Results 
We found that empowering farmers to enact actions affects man-
agement outcomes in terms of crane population size at staging sites and 
agricultural production at farm level (Figs. 2–4, & S2 in Supplementary 
Material 2). Very low levels of farmer budget led to increases in the 
population because farmers chose scaring as a less budget demanding 
action, which helped individual farmers in the short term by scaring 
birds off their land, but led to high population size across all farms on the 
landscape in the longer term (Figs. 2–4c,d & S2 in Supplementary Ma-
terial 2). On the contrary, very high farmer budgets led to high extinc-
tion risk (up to 22.5%) of the population (Fig. 3d & S3 in Supplementary 
Material 2), whereas simulations of intermediate budgets allowed 
farmers to control the population size around the management target 
and kept the impact on agricultural production to intermediary levels 
(Figs. 2–4d). 
3.1. Management scenario a 
Scenario a illustrates a long-term and exponential increase of the 
crane population from year 2020 (mean N = 19,123) to 2049 (mean N =
109,298; Fig. 2a). Changing farmer budget did not affect expected 
population size or agricultural production at t + 5 (year 2024) (Figs. 3a 
& 4a) due to lack of management and inability to scare or cull (i.e., 
scaring and/or culling and targeted population (N†>N)). 
3.2. Management scenario b 
Results from scenario b demonstrate a long-term and exponential 
population increase over years in the same way as in scenario a (year 
2021 mean N: 19,018 ind. and for 2050 mean N: 102,275; Fig. 2a, b). As 
the management target was always higher than the realized population 
(i.e., N† > N at year 2024), the manager set the costs for culling high 
relative to scaring (mean Cculling = 7.1 × Cscaring) to sustain the 
Table 1 
The management scenarios simulated over 30 time steps, in the GMSE v0.6.0.4 R 
package (Duthie et al., 2018). The management target is set by the manager and 
is given in number of cranes on the simulated landscape (i.e., staging site).  
Scenario Target Culling Scaring Addressed management 
A NA No No No management w. objective to sustain 
an increasing crane pop 
B NA Yes Yes Scaring, culling, w. objective to sustain 
an increasing crane pop 
C NA Yes No Culling, w. objective to sustain an 
increasing high crane pop 
D 15,000 Yes Yes Scaring, w. objective to sustain crane 
pop and agri.prod  
Fig. 2. Population size of common cranes over 30 years, given four different 
management scenarios and given intermediate farmer budgets (Bf: 1000) for 50 
stakeholders. The management scenarios are: a.) no management (red lines), b.) 
scaring and culling, without a realized management target (black lines), c.) only 
culling, without a realized management target (blue lines), d.) scaring and 
culling (gray lines), with a management target of 15,000 cranes (dotted gray 
line). The mean (points joined by lines), minimum and maximum (shaded 
areas) expected population sizes are based on data from 40 model simulations. 
Fig. 3. Effect of farmer budgets on expected population size of common cranes 
at year 2024 year in four different management scenarios; a.) no management, 
b.) scaring and culling, without a realized management target, c.) only culling, 
without a realized management target, d.) scaring and culling, with a man-
agement target of 15,000 cranes (dotted black line). The mean (black line), 
minimum and maximum (gray shaded areas) expected population sizes are 
based on the simulation output data at year 2024, given 50 stakeholders and are 
produced from 40 model simulation replicates. 
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population, which incentivized the farmers to allocate their budget to 
scaring instead of culling in year 2024 (Fig. S4 in Supplementary Ma-
terial 2). Nevertheless, occasional and limited culling (mean culled 
cranes per farmer: 0.004) occurred as farmer budget increased. Conse-
quently, the population size in year 2024 decreased slightly relative to 
scenario a (mean N from 22,691 to 18,201 ind; Fig. 3b.) and mean 
agricultural production increased from 64.9% to 71.0% of total expected 
production (Fig. 4b), within the range of increasing farmer budget (Bf: 
50–4000). 
3.3. Management scenario c 
In scenario c, the population increased exponentially over years, 
given intermediate farmer budgets (Bf:1000, for 2021 mean N = 18,931, 
and for 2050 mean N = 67,496, Fig. 2c.). However, the population 
growth was slower compared to scenario a and b (Fig. 2a, b, c). Further, 
for a given time step (t > 5) increasing farmer budgets caused the 
population size in 2024 to decline (e.g., mean N = 23,392 for Bf: 50 and 
N = 13,120 for Bf: 4000; Fig. 3c) as a consequence of increased number 
of culled cranes per farmer (i.e., 0–36 cranes for Bf: 50–4000; Fig. S5c in 
Supplementary Material 2). As a result of population limiting effects, the 
agricultural production increased from 64.7% to 78.4% along the same 
range of farmers budgets (Fig. 4c). Since culling is the only available but 
yet costly action, stakeholders will have no alternative to culling when 
budget allows. This causes stakeholders to take action uniformly when 
budgets exceed the cost of culling (Bf > Caction; Fig. S5c in Supplementary 
Material 2). However, when adding variability to the farmer budget, the 
small threshold effects in population size and agricultural production 
smooths out, as the farmer budgets exceeds their costs and incentivize 
actions at varying times (Fig. S6 in Supplementary Material 2). 
3.4. Management scenario d 
In scenario d, the population approached the management target of 
15,000 cranes with increasing farmer budgets and aligned with the 
targeted population size for a limited intermediate budget range (Bf: 
550–850). However, the population declined to below the targeted 
population size when farmer budgets further increased (Bf > 850) as 
result of stakeholder power overriding manager ability to set costs to 
minimize culling (Figs. 3d & 4d). The lowered manager target, 
compared to scenario a-c, caused the manager to dynamically adjust the 
relative costs of scaring and culling depending on the size of the current 
population relative to the target. When current population size was 
greater than the defined target, the managers incentivized culling by 
lowering the culling costs relative to scaring, whereas the opposite 
occurred if the population is lower than the defined target. This is also 
illustrated by a continuously increasing number of culled cranes per 
farmer (i.e., up to 35 cranes per farmer; Fig. S5d in Supplementary 
Material 2) until the population aligns with the management target (Bf: 
550–850; Fig. 2d & Fig. 3d), and occasionally with even greater number 
of culled cranes per farmer (maximum 57 ind; Fig. S5d in Supplementary 
Material 2) as farmer budget outstripped the power of managers to set 
culling cost. Mean agricultural production varies between 73.9–75.9% 
when the population aligned with the targeted population size, but 
increased further up to 95.3% as the population declines along the range 
of further increasing farmer budgets (Bf: 900–4000) and below the tar-
geted population size with an extinction risk of 22.5% (Fig. 4d & Fig. 
S3d in Supplementary Material 2.) 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Stakeholder empowerment in multi-objective management 
In order to manage conservation conflicts, collaboration between 
stakeholders and managing authorities to decide on trade-offs between 
multiple objectives (e.g., sustaining crane population and agricultural 
production) and providing local stakeholders with power to enact 
management have been addressed as critical and potentially more 
important than merely reducing negative impact from wildlife (Mason 
et al., 2018; Redpath et al., 2017, 2013). However, predicting the effects 
of providing stakeholders with power on the likelihood of adverse 
negative consequences (e.g., high extinction risk or the crane population 
being far from the management target and low agricultural production) 
have generally been over-looked when predicting management out-
comes and risk of conflict from models (but see Bunnefeld et al., 2017; 
Milner-Gulland, 2011). Our findings demonstrate that empowering a 
large number of stakeholders comes with the challenge of finding a 
delicate balance of the degree of empowerment. Very high farmer 
stakeholder power means the wildlife population is at an increased risk 
of extinction (e.g., up to 22.5%, year 2024 in scenario d) when lethal 
control is an option whereas very low stakeholder power means high 
wildlife populations and extensive negative impact on agricultural 
production. Our study shows that knowledge and management of 
stakeholder power and actions is needed to manage a sensitive trade-off 
between wildlife conservation and agriculture. Furthermore, our study 
shows that by modeling the interaction between two groups of stake-
holders (manager and farmers) with potentially opposing views, we 
contribute to our understanding of the complexity as well as challenges 
and risks of stakeholder empowerment and decentralization of decision 
making. 
As the protected crane population along the European flyways likely 
will continue to increase, so will the negative impact on agricultural 
production, and trade-offs in management objectives between agricul-
tural production and a sustainable crane population, affecting associ-
ated conservation conflict. A multiple-objective management will 
require interventions to regulate the population size with sustainable 
culling strategies, careful monitoring and modeling efforts to predict the 
Fig. 4. Effect of farmer budget on mean agricultural production per farmers’ 
land at staging sites of common cranes in four different management scenarios, 
a) no management, b) scaring and culling, without a realized management 
target, c) only culling, without a realized management target d) scaring and 
culling, with a management target of 15,000 cranes. The mean (black line), 
minimum and maximum (gray shaded areas) mean agricultural production per 
farmers’ land are based on the simulation output data at year 2024, given 50 
stakeholders and produced from 40 model simulation replicates. 
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likely impacts of alternative strategies (Cusack et al., 2019; Johnson 
et al., 2014). Our modeling demonstrates that a large community of 
farmers managing the crane population in a coordinated fashion may 
effectively regulate the population, and thus maintain (or even increase) 
agricultural production (scenario c-d). The specifics of the quota system 
set by the manager will have an effect on population size. For example, 
culling quotas of a limited number of cranes to all individual farmers (as 
opposed to, e.g., higher quotas to a very small number of individuals, as 
currently is the case) may be an approach to increase equitable distri-
bution of individual power (Redpath et al., 2017). However, our simu-
lations also highlight that the total number of licenses to cull cranes 
needs to be carefully considered to maintain population sustainability 
(Fig. 2c,d & S5 in Supplementary Material 2). This is true especially if no 
other management actions (e.g., scaring, diversionary fields) are 
possible, as even small increases of a few cranes to cull per stakeholder 
may cause the population growth rate to decline (scenario c & d). To-
day’s license system in Sweden is based on very limited quotas from the 
county administrative boards (up to 10 cranes) to a minority of the 
farmers (EEA, n.d.), which based on our results likely have insignificant 
effects on either population size or agricultural production. Yet, our 
findings show that the extent to which farmers’ impact on the crane 
population and agricultural production can be significant and is 
dependent on the power given to the farmers. This could be an effective 
way to perform management in line with policy and to decrease prac-
tical or monetary costs for farmers. It could for example include 
compensation schemes for farmers to pay for labor connected to culling 
or scaring actions, provision of scaring devices, decoys or hides for 
culling, and coordination and help by employed personnel to scare and 
cull cranes (Hake et al., 2010; Nilsson et al., 2018). Our study exem-
plifies that if licensed culling would be permitted (i.e., relocated from 
annex I to annex II in the EU Birds directive; EC, 2009), extensive 
stakeholder effort would be needed to reduce the population to a lower 
management target (e.g., >25 culled individuals per farmer after 5 years 
in our model). Accordingly, our findings have implications for the 
evidence-informed flyway management plans implemented for several 
thriving goose species under the United Nations African Eurasian 
Waterbird Agreement (AEWA) (Madsen et al., 2017; Stroud et al., 2017). 
These management plans consist of agreed population targets, to be 
delivered via adaptive management, population monitoring, population 
estimation and country-specific culling quotas (Madsen et al., 2017). 
Our study highlights that stakeholder empowerment and culling stra-
tegies based on the number of stakeholders, and particularly their power 
to implement effective actions, needs careful consideration and moni-
toring when setting population targets and decentralized policy (Bayn-
ham-Herd et al., 2018; Mason et al., 2017; Williams and Madsen, 2013). 
4.2. The management strategy evaluation framework to model social- 
ecological systems 
Our findings demonstrate how individual-based modeling and the 
management strategy evaluation framework can be used to investigate 
the effects of manager’s and stakeholders’ interactive decisions in 
management of natural resources and ‘wicked’ conservation conflicts in 
complex and uncertain systems, such as for a protected and increasing 
crane population causing negative impact on agricultural production 
(Bunnefeld et al., 2011; Duthie et al., 2018; Smith, 1999). Until now, 
MSE models have used constant decision-making rules for single stake-
holders over time (Bunnefeld et al., 2013; Melbourne-Thomas et al., 
2017; Milner-Gulland, 2011), whereas we used GMSE to simulate sce-
narios including a large number of individual stakeholders taking de-
cisions independently, as influenced by changes in the wildlife 
population, agricultural production and policy set by the manager. 
GMSE is freely available as a package in the R environment and includes 
a graphical user interface that can be accessed from the R console or a 
browser online (GUI; Duthie, 2020). All GMSE code is open-source, 
further allowing the development of increased use of the model and 
the empowerment of all stakeholders through investment in communi-
cation and co-development of the model (Duthie et al., 2018). 
Socio-ecological and individual-based models like these simplify 
empirical systems to investigate key concepts and clarify theory, and 
inevitably make complex trade-offs between the extent of realism and 
integration of knowledge (Schlüter et al., 2019). Our model necessarily 
makes some restrictive assumptions about crane ecology and manage-
ment due to limited access to empirical data for model parameterization. 
For example, we do not have data on individual cranes’ impact on 
agricultural production, or on the exact economic consequences for 
farmers, which likely is influenced by, e.g., market prices, weather, and 
timing of harvest (Montràs-Janer et al., 2019; Nilsson et al., 2016). 
Further, socio-ecological and individual-based models are based on the 
assumption that human decision-making is bounded rationale (Schlüter 
et al., 2019). In our model, farmers and managers are assumed to make 
decisions relating to a single objective (i.e., farmers to maximize pro-
duction, managers to minimize the difference between current and 
targeted crane population size). Instead, in real-world situations, indi-
vidual managers and farmers with diverse norms are likely to adaptively 
make trade-offs between multiple objectives over time and in relation to 
decisions taken by other stakeholders (Schill et al., 2019). In the context 
of cranes and farming, an example could be farmers potentially toler-
ating a certain number of cranes and thus negative impact on their 
agricultural production to sustain biodiversity, given certain manage-
ment conditions. The mechanisms for such stakeholder multi-objective 
trade-offs are not very well understood to date, and require further 
empirical and theoretical study (Bunnefeld et al., 2017; Schill et al., 
2019) 
4.3. Conclusions 
A large number of stakeholders, e.g., farmers and managers, natu-
rally causes complications to optimal trade-offs in decision making in 
natural resource management, and small changes in stakeholder 
behavior or policy are found to potentially have large scale implications 
for the dynamics of entire socio-ecological systems (Heal and Kun-
reuther, 2012; Scheffer et al., 2012). To advance previous modeling of 
the MSE framework, we used the GMSE model to simulate and predict 
the long-term effects of empowering multiple farmers to dynamically 
respond to policy, the crane population and impact on agricultural 
production under uncertainty. Our findings demonstrate that empow-
ering a large number of farming stakeholders to pursue their manage-
ment objectives comes with the challenge of finding a sensitive balance 
of the degree of empowerment. Not providing stakeholders with budgets 
to enact actions may lead to frustration, ineffective management and 
risk of conflict; whereas unlimited farming stakeholder budgets may 
cause conflicts when conservation stakeholder objectives override 
management objectives (Mason et al., 2018; Redpath et al., 2013). This 
suggests that collaboration between managing authorities and stake-
holders may be critical to agree on and act in line with multi-objective 
management targets. Carefully considered levels of stakeholder 
empowerment may so enhance democratization and trust between 
parties with the aim to manage ‘wicked’ conservation conflicts (Mason 
et al., 2018; Redpath et al., 2017; Williams and Madsen, 2013). 
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Ayllón, D., 2020. The ODD protocol for describing agent-based and other simulation 
models: a second update to improve clarity, replication, and structural realism. 
JASSS 23. https://doi.org/10.18564/jasss.4259. 
Hake, M., Månsson, J., Wiberg, A., 2010. A working model for preventing crop damage 
caused by increasing goose populations in Sweden. Ornis. Svec. 20, 225–233. 
Hamblin, S., 2013. On the practical usage of genetic algorithms in ecology and evolution. 
Methods Ecol. Evol. https://doi.org/10.1111/2041-210X.12000. 
Hauert, C., Holmes, M., Doebeli, M., 2006. Evolutionary games and population 
dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games. Proc. R. Soc. B Biol. 
Sci. 273, 2565–2570. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.3600. 
Heal, G., Kunreuther, H., 2012. Tipping Climate negotiations, Climate Change and 
Common Sense : Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling. Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692873.003.0004. 
Henle, K., Alard, D., Clitherow, J., Cobb, P., Firbank, L., Kull, T., McCracken, D., 
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Montràs-Janer, T., Knape, J., Nilsson, L., Tombre, I., Pärt, T., Månsson, J., 2019. Relating 
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